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Abstract
Financial statement fraud has cost market participants, including investors, employees, creditors, and
pensioners. Capital market participants expect active and vigilant corporate governance to ensure the quality,
integrity, and transparency of financial information. Financial statement fraud is a serious threat to market
participants’ confidence in published audited financial statements. Financial statement fraud has recently
received considerable attention from the business community, accounting profession, academicians, and
regulators. This paper sheds light on the factors that may increase the likelihood of financial statement fraud.
This study empirically tests the impact of board of commissioners and audit committee effectiveness, ownership
structure, bank monitoring, and the firm life cycle on the probability of accounting fraud. Hypothesis testing
was carried out by using logistic regression model using fraud data from BAPEPAM-LK (Indonesia Stock
Exchange Supervisory Agency) during the years of 2005-2011. The result of this study indicates that the
audit committee effectiveness and controlled family ownership reduce the fraud probability. However, the
effectiveness of board commissioners, foreign ownership, bank monitoring, and the firm life cycle do not have
any effect on fraud probability.

Keywords: fraud, board of commissioner effectiveness, audit committee effectiveness, ownership
structure, bank monitoring, firm life cycle.

Abstrak
Kecurangan pelaporan keuangan menimbulkan kerugian bagi pelaku pasar, antara lain investor, pegawai,
kreditur. Kecurangan ini juga merupakan ancaman yang serius bagi para pelaku pasar modal. Pelaku pasar modal
mengharapkan laporan keuangan yang transparan, berkualitas, dan dapat dipercaya integritasnya. Penelitian
ini bertujuan menguji pengaruh efektifitas peran dewan komisaris dan komite audit, struktur kepemilikan,
peran monitoring bank, dan siklus hidup perusahaan terhadap probabilita terjadinya kecurangan pelaporan
keuangan. Pengujian hipotesis dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode regresi logistik dengan menggunakan
data sanksi yang dikenakan pada perusahaan yang melakukan kecurangan pelaporan keuangan, yang diperoleh
dari Bapepam-LK dari tahun 2005 sampai dengan 2011. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa efektifitas
peran komite audit dan struktur kepemilikan keluarga berpengaruh negatif terhadap probabilita terjadinya
kecurangan pelaporan keuangan. Hal ini mengindikasikan efektifitas komite audit dan kepemilikan yang
dikendalikan oleh keluarga dapat mengurangi probabilita terjadinya kecurangan pelaporan keuangan.

Kata Kunci : fraud, corporate governance, efektifitas komite audit, struktur kepemilikan, pengawasan
bank, siklus hidup perusahaan.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial statements, which are required
to be reported periodically, represent the
company’s responsibility to inform its
stakeholders about the company’s financial
condition. As one of the information sources
used for decision making by the company’s
stakeholders, financial statements must
provide reliable and relevant information. On
the other hand, this important role of financial
statements in such decisions also leads to
moral hazard situation during the financial
reporting process, for example in the case of
Enron, WorldCom, and Kimia Farma. Those
accounting fraud cases have raised questions
about how governance mechanisms are able
to ensure a company is well managed based
on good corporate governance principles. The
existence of effective board of commissioners
and audit committee should have a positive
impact on good corporate governance
practices. Yi et al. (2010) find that the board and
audit committee characteristics have negative
effects on fraud in the financial report.
As a creditor, banks must manage their
credit risks to minimize such risks. Banks
must have a high quality monitoring system
to prevent the borrower’s misconduct which
can result in a default position. Therefore, the
role of bank monitoring can be considered as
an external governance mechanism. Ahn and
Choi (2009) find that a higher level of bank
monitoring decreases the borrowers’ earnings
management behavior. Therefore, bank
monitoring could prevent borrowers from
doing accounting fraud when preparing their
financial statements.
The company’s ownership structure
should have an impact to the good corporate
governance. Agency problems between
management and owner may not occur in
family firms, but may occur between majority
and minority shareholders. Family firms are
usually owned and controlled by the family
as the majority shareholders. The governance
mechanisms in family firms tend to not
function optimally because there is no urgent
need to monitor the management action from
the shareholders perspective. Less control
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and minority shareholders expropriation by
majority shareholders could increase the
probability of accounting fraud in the firm’s
financial reporting. Foreign ownership in
the company is considered having a positive
impact on company’s control because the
company should follow stricter regulations
from the shareholders’ home country. Foreign
owner has more concern towards the increase
of good corporate governance so that it can
help with fraud prevention (Chen et al. 2006).
The company financial performance
tends to be different in different company life
cycle stages. The profit reported will have an
important role in the process of the performance
evaluation at the mature and young company
(Smith and Watts 1992). Therefore, there is
a tendency that the manager of mature and
young company will be motivated to do an
income increasing or income decreasing
earnings management in order to maintain or
to increase the market value and to get a good
performance evaluation. Companies which
do not face any difficulties in generating good
financial performance should be less motivated
to do any fraud.
The contribution of this study is to conclude
whether corporate governance related factors,
such as governance structure and ownership
structure are associated with the probability of
accounting fraud. The other contribution is to
examine whether the roles of bank monitoring
on the borrowers prevent the accounting fraud
and also whether the accounting fraud depends
on the company’s life cycle. Compared to
previous research, this study includes bank
monitoring and life cycle of the firm, whether
they are associated with the probability of
accounting fraud. The result from this study
confirms that an effective audit committee
and a controlled family ownership reduce the
probability of accounting fraud.
The remaining parts of this paper will
be divided as follows: Section (2) develops
the underlying theory of board of director
effectiveness, audit committee effectiveness,
ownership structure, bank monitoring, life
cycle of the firm, and the occurrence of
financial statement fraud; Section (3) describes
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the hypotheses developments; Section (4)
describes the sample selection process;
Section (5) details the research design; Section
(6) contains the empirical results of the study;
and Section (7) concludes the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Financial Statement Fraud
Most of previous studies have found
that the quality of financial statement can
be affected by the existence of earnings
management. As Healy and Wahlen (1999)
and similarly Schipper (1989) define,
earnings management occurs when managers
use judgment in financial reporting and in
structuring transaction to alter financial reports
to either mislead some stakeholders about
the underlying economic performance of the
company or to influence contractual outcomes
that depend on reported accounting numbers.
Low earnings quality can result in incorrect
decision making. For example, in the context
of IPO (Initial of Public Offering), investor
may overpay the shares because of this
earnings management. Teoh et al. (1998) state
that investment in firms with high earnings
management tend to perform poorly in future
periods. Earnings management is sometimes
distinguished from earning manipulation
since earnings tend to be managed by using
discretionary accruals, which is based on
judgment, but still comply to accounting
standard. Earning management which violates
the accounting standard compliance will be
considered as accounting fraud. Perols and
Lougee (2011) explain that a fraud exists if
the manager uses his valuation when making
the financial report and when it engineers the
transaction so that the financial report will
give a different result from the real economic
situation of the company, and this act is done by
violating the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). They find fraud ﬁrms are
more likely to have managed earnings in prior
years and that earnings management in prior
years is associated with a higher likelihood
that ﬁrms meet or beat analyst forecasts or
inﬂate revenue.

Good Corporate Governance
Good corporate governance is expected to
prevent the occurrence of financial statement
fraud. Cheng et al. (2010) state that the main
factors affecting the accounting fraud of listed
companies are the ownership structure and
internal governance control responsibilities.
The good corporate governance principle is
to make companies more accountable to their
stakeholders. Therefore, companies that have a
strong governance mechanism are expected to
be less likely to do accounting fraud.
Board of Commissioners
One of the internal governance structures
is the board of commissioners1 who has the
main function to supervise and monitor the
management action. The objective of good
corporate governance can be achieved only if
the board of commissioners can perform their
responsibilities effectively. The effectiveness
of the board of commissioners is affected by
its characteristics, i.e. independence, activity,
size, and competence (Hermawan 2009).
The purpose of having independent
commissioners as the board member is to ensure
the unbiased decision making to prevent the
minority shareholders expropriation. Bhagat et
al. (2008) state that the more independent the
board of directors, the better the performance
of the company. Ramos and Olalla (2011)
also find that the existence of the independent
directors have a positive effect towards the
company’s performance when the company
is run by the founder. Jia et al. 2009 find
that inside director composition has positive
relationship with the probability of financial
statement fraud.
The meeting activity organized by the
board of commissioners is one aspect that can
affect the effectiveness of the monitoring role.
The active board of commissioners, which
regularly organizes meetings, will know the
Indonesia adopts two-tier management system which
completely separates supervisory function of the board
of commissioners and executive function. Therefore,
the board of commissioners in this study is similar to the
board of directors in the one-tier management system in
other countries

1
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problems more in detail and earlier so that the
monitoring will be more systematically and can
be done earlier. Ramos and Olalla (2011) find
that board meetings are positively associated
with the company’s performance, but it will
become weaker when the family business is
run by the founder. The board size can also
affect the effectiveness of the board. Beasley
(1996) finds the positive association of the
board size and the possibility of fraud in the
financial report. Klein (2002) finds that audit
committee independence increases with board
size. Cheng et al. (2008) find the smaller board
size is better, and this condition will improve
the performance of the company. Competence
of the board members is an important factor
for the effectiveness of the board. This
competence will affect the ability of the board
to carry out their monitoring functions. Some
studies have shown that a negative relationship
between expertise in the financial field and
the probability of a deviation in the financial
reporting, profit management, fault, and
restatements (Cunningham 2007). Chen et al.
(2006) also find that the chairman of the board
who has only a partial experience will have a
low capability to detect a fraud.
Audit Committee
In performing their duties, board
of commissioner is supported by audit
committee. The main purpose of the audit
committee function is to ensure the quality and
the reliability of financial report. Therefore
the likelihood of accounting fraud should
be reduced by an audit committee which
performs effectively. Similar to the board
of commissioner effectiveness, the audit
committee effectiveness is also influenced by
their characteristics independence, activity,
size, and competence (Hermawan 2009).
Persons (2005) finds some aspects of the
audit committee, such as whether the member
of the audit committee is the director of
another company and the tenure of this audit
committee member, have a direct implication
towards the improvement of the corporate
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governance in the future. Bronson et al. (2009)
find that the advantage of the independent
audit committee can only be achieved when the
whole audit committee is really independent
(100% independent). Jackson et al. (2009)
also conclude that the probability of fraud is
negatively associated with the independent
audit committee.
The activity of the audit committee
represents whether the audit committee
performs its function effectively. The audit
committee activities are represented by the
number of meetings that have been taken place
by the audit committee in one year. Persons
(2009) finds that companies that employ early
voluntary ethics disclosure have the tendency
to have a larger audit committee, a more
independent audit committee, and an audit
committee which organize more meetings,
and also have lower tendency to exercise fraud
in its financial report. Lin et al. (2006) find a
negative association between the size of audit
committee and the occurrence of earnings
restatement. Kalbers and Fogarty’s (1993)
research suggests that a large audit committee
tends to enhance the audit committee’s status
and power within an organization.
The competence that must be possessed
by audit committee is the ability to have an
adequate understanding of accounting, audit,
and the system that are being applied in the
company. The audit committee member must
also have the ability and knowledge of how to
analyze a financial report. Zhang et al. (2007),
Hoitash et al. (2009), and Sharma et al. (2009)
state that the audit committee with only a few
accounting and financial expertise with no
finance and accounting background is related
with a weaker internal control of the company.
Bank Monitoring
Banks have a specific interest for
monitoring the borrower’s activities to manage
their credit risk. Banks have some privilege in
monitoring the borrowers because they can
have the information needed directly from
the borrowers. Ahn and Choi (2009) find that
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a borrowing ﬁrm’s earnings management
behavior generally decreases as the strength
of bank monitoring increases. The strength
of bank monitoring seems to be affected only
by (1) the magnitude of a bank loan, (2) the
reputation (rank) of a lead bank, and (3) the
length of a bank loan. As stated by Perols
and Lougee (2011), earnings management
could becomes an indicator the firms that has
conducted fraud, a company that have a high
monitoring level by the banks should have
lower possibility to commit accounting fraud.
Ownership Structure
Companies that are controlled by families
have a structure which will lessen the agency
conflict between the shareholders and the
manager, and the creditor believes that
companies which are controlled by families
are more concerned with creditors’ interest
and have less monitoring cost according to
Fama and Jensen (1983). The result of Arifin’s
(2003) study shows that the public company
in Indonesia controlled by the family or by
the state or by the financial institution has less
agency problem if compared to companies
that are controlled by the public or without
a prominent controller. According to him, in
companies that are controlled by families,
there are less agency problems because of the
decrease of conflicts between the principal
and the agent. If the family ownership is
more efficient and the agency is better, there
is no problem between the interest of the
agent and the principal, which means that the
management will lead the company as well
as possible for the benefit of the “family” so
that the company will be run efficiently and
honestly. Jiang and Peng (2011) find that the
presence of CEO who has family relationship
can enhance companies’ stock return (in
Indonesia and Taiwan). Therefore, a company
with a high family ownership will have a
low tendency to conduct fault compared to
companies that have a low family ownership.
On the contrary, some studies suggest that
higher family ownership raise other types of

agency problem, i.e. between the family and
non-controlling shareholders (majority and
minority). This problem main induce family
to commit accounting fraud to hide their
expropriation of firms wealth. Higher family
ownership has higher probability of financial
statement fraud (Geriesh 2003). Families are
also capable of expropriating wealth from
the firm through excessive compensation,
related-party transactions, or special dividends
(Anderson and Reeb 2003). DeAngelo,
DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) suggest that the
family’s desire for special dividends can impact
the firm’s capital expansion plans, leading to
poor operating and stock price performance.
Contrary to the notion that family
ownership increases other type agency
problem between the family and non
controlling shareholders, Villalonga and Amit
(2006) in their studies found that the classic
owner manager conflict in nonfamily firms is
more costly than the conflict between family
and nonfamily shareholders in founder CEO
forms. Their studies emphasize that the family
ownership will reduce the problem between the
shareholder’s and agent to commit accounting
fraud. Anderson and Reeb (2002) also found
minority stockholders actually have advantage
from family ownership, and minority share
holders are not adversely affected by family
ownership, suggesting that family ownership
is an effective organizational structure.
Companies that are fully or partially
owned by foreign investor usually should
comply with the foreign regulation which is
compulsory by the regulator of investor home
country. The long distance location sometimes
also needs higher quality of controlled
system to enable the high return for foreign
investor. The regulation concerning corporate
governance in other country usually has higher
standard than in Indonesia which is known to
have weak corporate governance. Chen et al.
(2006) explain that companies with foreign
ownership tend to commit less fraud, because
of the existence of foreign ownership, and the
monitoring level is higher which will help to
prevent fraud.
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Company Life Cycle
The ability to generate profit in a company
generally depends on the life cycle stages.
During the introductory stage, company
operation is usually unstable and therefore the
profit is also uncertain. In the mature stage, the
competition is usually more intense and the
demand is not expanding anymore, therefore
the company’s ability to generate profit is
getting more difficult.
Managers in companies which are in the
growth stage of the life cycle generally will take
steps to lessen profit if they feel that their profit
is superfluous (Al Najjar and Riahi-Belkaoui
2001). In companies that are in the mature stage
of their life cycle, the investment activities
are no more a priority and the operational
environment is more stable if compared with
companies that are still growing (Balkin and
Gomez-Mejia 1987). The profit reported
will have an important role in the process
of the performance evaluation at the mature
company (Smith and Watts 1992). Because the
reported net income will become important in
the performance evaluation, it becomes the
bases for value management performance. In
order to maintain or increase the market value
and to get a good performance evaluation, the
manager of mature company tends to increase
their reported net income.
Earning management has become an
indicator to detect companies that have
conducted fraud (Perols and Lougee 2011).
Companies that are in the young life cycle stage
(growth stage) will conduct a management to
reduce profit, and companies that are in the
mature life cycle have tendencies to maximize
company’s profit. According to the definition
proposed by Perols and Lougee (2011), they
define manipulation of the financial report or
have been conducting a profit management (or
both). Thus, companies that are at the young
and mature stage will frequently commit fraud.
Hypotheses Development
Board of Commissioners and Probability of
Accounting Fraud
The effectiveness of the board of
commissioners’ performance will prevent
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management from opportunistic behavior.
The board of commissioners effectiveness is
affected by its characteristics, i.e. independence,
activity, size, and competence (Hermawan
2009). Chen et al. (2006), Wagner (2011), and
Beasley (1996) examine some characteristics
of the board and they find that there is a
positive relationship between characteristic
of the board with the quality of the financial
report. A financial report is considered to
have a high quality if it can be relied upon as
a source of timely and accurate information.
High quality of financial reporting means
that financial statements are free from fraud.
Higher quality financial report should have a
significant effect on reducing the likelihood
of financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996).
Therefore, an effectiveness score is made
based on the four characteristics. The higher
score of effectiveness will reflect the better
performance of the board, which should be
able to reduce probability of fraud.
H1a: Higher board of commissioners
effectiveness score reduces the
probability of accounting fraud.
Audit Committee and Probability of
Accounting Fraud
The role of the audit committee is to
ensure the quality and the reliability of
financial report. If audit committee has an
effective role, company should present higher
quality of financial reports. Bronson et al.
(2009) and Jackson et al. (2009) state that
the effectiveness of the audit committee will
also affect some characteristics which are
proven by previous study: independence,
activity, size, and competence of the audit
committee. The purpose of audit committee
is to monitor management performance,
including company's operations and financial
reporting. Higher quality of audit committee
will also improve the quality of management
performance, which ultimately leads to the
good quality of financial reporting. Firm with
higher quality of audit committee will result
higher quality of financial report and will be less
likely to be sanctioned for fraudulent reporting
(Abbot et al. 2000). Therefore, the likelihood
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of accounting fraud should be reduced by an
audit committee which performs effectively.
An audit committee effectiveness score is
also developed based on the characteristics of
activity, size, and competence. Independence
is automatically assumed for audit committee
in Indonesia.
H2a: Higher audit committee effectiveness
score reduces the probability of
accounting fraud.
		
Bank Monitoring and Probability of
Accounting Fraud
Bank as a creditor have some privileges
in monitoring the borrowers because they can
have the information needed directly from the
borrowers. Monitoring of the bank can increase
the quality of corporate governance. Ahn
and Choi (2009) find that a borrowing ﬁrm’s
earnings management behavior generally
decreases as the strength of bank monitoring
increases. The strength of bank monitoring
seems to be affected only by (1) the magnitude
of a bank loan, (2) the reputation (rank) of a
lead bank, and (3) the length of a bank loan.
This study used the reputation of bank to
measure monitoring quality.
H3a: Higher amount of loan from bank
with high monitoring quality reduces
the probability of accounting fraud.
Ownership Structure and Probability of
Accounting Fraud
Dispersed ownership structure is found
only in the Unites States of America and Britain
(Murhadi 2008). Whereas, in most developing
countries, the ownership structure of company
is under family control (concentrated
ownership structure). Theoretically, family
ownership reduces agency problem type I
between management and stock holder (Jensen
and Meckling 1976), however recent research
show that concentrated ownership will result
in emergence agency problem type II between
majority and minority (Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1988). There are 2 (two) types of
agency problem: the first type (Type I) is an
agency problem conflict which arise between
management (agent) with stock holder

(principal), while the second type (type II)
conflict arise between majority stock holders
with minority stock holder.
La Porta et al. (1999) reported that 85% of
companies in Spain are still under the family
control. Likewise, in Indonesia, the majority
of companies in the Indonesians are still under
control of the founding family (Arifin 2003).
Structure of family control ownership reduces
agency conflicts between shareholders and
creditors, and the lender assumes ownership
of the family concerned to creditors, in the
presence of control family, monitoring cost
will be lower (Fama & Jensen 1983). Anderson
and Reeb (2003) found that a company owned
by the family has better performance because
of the existence of family founders.
Furthermore, company which is owned
and controlled by family will have lower
probability to do financial statement fraud.
Arifin’s (2003) study shows that the public
companies in Indonesia controlled by the
family or by the state or by the financial
institution have a less agency problem if
compared to companies that are controlled by
public or without a prominent controller. Jiang
and Peng (2011) have evidence that the present
of a CEO who has family relations will have
higher equity return (in Indonesia and Taiwan)
compared with companies in which the CEO
does not have family relations. Higher equity
return signed that investor (in Indonesia
and Taiwan) has believed to management
performance, in which the management has
family relationship. The classic owner manager
conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than
the conflict between family and nonfamily
shareholders in founder CEO forms (Villalonga
and Amit 2006). Their study emphasize that
the family ownership will reduce the problem
between the shareholder’s and agent to commit
accounting fraud. Anderson and Reeb (2002)
also find minority stockholders who actually
have advantage from family ownership and
minority share holders are not adversely
affected by family ownership, suggesting that
family ownership is an effective organizational
structure.
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H4a : Companies which are owned and
controlled by family have lower
probability of accounting fraud.
The foreign capital ownership is one way
to create good corporate governance. Usually,
the foreign investors have a high standard of
corporate governance in their home country.
Due to their global integrity, the foreign
investors ensure management to work well in
the developing countries. Chen et al. (2006)
and Chevalier et al. (2006) find that when the
company has foreign ownership, the company’s
performance will be positive, and the financial
report published will be more trustworthy.
H5a : Higher proportion of foreign
ownership reduces the probability
of accounting fraud.
Company Life Cycle and Probability of
Accounting Fraud
Every company has a life cycle stages.
Owen and Yawson (2010) divide the company
life cycle into three cycles: young, mature, and
old. Life cycle of the firm affects the component
of company’s balance sheet, income statement
and cash flow report (Savich and Thompson
1978). It means that companies which have
different firm life cycle will perform different
earning management. Savich and Thomson
(1978) also find that companies in the young
and mature life cycle stage have tendency to
do earning management. This paper draws on
two separate views of an old stage firm life
cycle:
1. Old stage firm life cycle has incentives to
inflate earnings due to earnings decline.
2. Old stage firm life cycle has lower
incentives to inflate earnings due to the
declining financial condition of company.
In this stage, the pressure to perform
earning management is lower than the
other stage (young and mature). This study
refers to the second view and it is supported
by the studies of Fouad and Riahi (2001).
They find that companies which are in the
young stage tend to choose accounting
method which lowers the reported
earnings because they need free cash
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flow for expansion and new investment.
Companies which are in the mature stage
tend to choose accounting method which
increases reported earnings because they
often using reported earnings-based bonus
plans as a fixed salary component (Skinner
1996). Therefore, reported earnings will
play an important role in management
performance evaluation (Smith and Watts
1992). According to Perols and Lougee
(2011), if GAAP rules are broke, managed
reported earnings (lowering or increasing
reported earnings) will be charged as
a fraud. Since the number of reported
earnings seems to be very important for
the young and mature firms, the tendency
to perform earnings management that
violates GAAP rules is higher for young
and mature firm (commit to do fraud).
Thus, companies that are at the young
and mature life cycle stage will frequently
conduct earnings management that leads to
financial statement fraud.
H6a: Companies which are in the young life
cycle stage have higher probability of
accounting fraud.
H7a: Companies which are in the mature
life cycle stage have higher probability
of accounting fraud.
Companies with a high debt ratio have
incentive to violate the loan agreement because
of the pressure on management to comply
with the loan agreement, with assumption
that the underperform company is under
pressure to incorrect financial statements
(Perols and Lougee 2011). Leverage is also
a ratio to measure financial difficulties, and
companies that have high leverage ratios tend
to be investigated by the Chinese Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Chen et al.
2006). Leverage has a positive correlation with
accounting policies which increase earnings.
Companies with a high leverage ratio tend to
be motivated to accrued smaller liability or
larger asset in order to avoid violating debt
covenant. From the previous research above,
it is concluded that leverage has a positive
correlation to companies’ probability of
committing accounting fraud.

28

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Juni 2013, Vol. 10, No. 1, hal 20 - 39

Researches on the size in relation to fraud
produce various conclusions. Park and Pastena
(1991) conclude that the targeted companies
penalized by SEC is over-the-counter firm
which is relatively small. Persons (1995)
states that firm size is negatively correlated to
accounting fraud. Lee and Choi (2002) also
find that small companies has a tendency to
do earnings management more frequently to
avoid losses than large firms. However, Rezaei
(2012) proves that the bigger the company,
the more likely it is to commit earning
management so that there will be a relationship
between the positive discretionary accruals
and profits in the future. Suwito and Herawaty
(2005) find evidence that the larger companies
have a greater incentive to perform income
smoothing compared to the smaller companies.
It is because the larger companies become the
subject of examination (government and public
pay more attention to the larger companies).
Firm size is not just a number that stated the
company's scale. Firm size can also determine
what policy will be taken by the company in
certain circumstances.
DATA AND METHOD
Sample Selection and Description
The population of this study is all nonfinancial companies which are registered in
Indonesian Stock Exchange in the years of
2005–2011. The samples are all companies
which were reported to have some accounting

frauds by BAPEPAM-LK during those years.
There are 47 companies reported as companies
with problems in their financial reports. Then,
47 companies which do not have problems
with their financial reports are taken as paired
samples. The total samples in this study are
94. The criteria of sample selection are: (i)
companies engaged in financial industry,
insurance and banking were excluded from
the sample; (ii) companies that do not have
data or incomplete financial statements are not
included; (iii) companies selected as the paired
sample is a company that does not do fraud,
has total assets of +/ - 30% of fraud firm total
assets, and also in the same industry with the
fraud firm. Sample selection is done through
the matching process, following Beasley
(1996) and Chen et al. (2006). The sample
selection can be seen in Table 1.
The 47 fraud companies which are the
sample of this study are divided into 9 industrial
sectors classified by the BEI (Indonesian Stock
Exchange). The sample distribution can be
seen in Table 2.
Table 3 shows the category of the
financial reports with problems based on the
BAPEPAM-LK valuation.
Research Design
To test the hypothesis of this study, the
regression logistics was used. The dependent
variable in this study is a binary variable,
that is, whether company was practicing
fraud or not in their financial report. In this
study, to determine the relationship between

Table 1
Sample Description
Sample Description
Number of sample in 2005
Number of sample in 2006
Number of sample in 2007
Number of sample in 2008
Number of sample in 2009
Number of sample in 2010
Number of sample in 2011
Total Sample

Amount

Percentage

1
3
12
17
3
9
2

2.13%
6.38%
25.53%
36.17%
6.38%
19.15%
4.26%

47

100%
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Table 2
Distribution of the Sample Based on the Industry Sector
No

Industry Sector

Fraud Financial
Statement

Percentage

1

Agriculture

3

6,38%

2

Mining

5

10,64%

3

Basic Industry and Chemical

7

14,89%

4

Miscellaneous Industry

4

8,51%

5

Consumer Goods Industry

3

6,38%

6

Property, Real Estate and Construction

4

8,51%

7

Infrastructure, Utility and Transportation

9

19,15%

8

Trade, Service and Investment

12

25,53%

47

100%

Total Sample

Table 3
Category of the Financial Reports With Problems
Fraud Financial Statement Category

Amount

Percentage

Unintentional Misstatement

12

26%

Not in accordance with PSAK

6

13%

Deliberately Misstatement

5

11%

Disclosure

10

21%

Materiality and delays in the delivery of
information material

14

30%

47

100%

Total

effectiveness of the board of commissioners,
effectiveness of the audit committee, the
role of bank monitoring, structure of family
ownership, structure of foreign ownership,
age, and life cycle of the company with fraud
in their financial report, the following equation
was used:
P(FRAUD)i,t = α + β1 SCOREBDi,t
+ β2 SCOREACi,t +
β3 CREDITOR i,t
+
β4 FAMOWNi,t
+ β5
FOREIGNi,t
+
β6
YOUNGi,t + β7 MATUREi,t
+ β8 LVRGi,t + β9 SIZEi,t +
Where:
P(FRAUD)i,t

YEARSi,t +
INDUSTRYi,t + ε i,t
: Company i that is fraudulent
at its financial report (fraud)

at year t. This variable is
originated from the information
as given by the Bapepam-LK
(Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal
dan Lembaga keuangan- The
Stock Exchange and Financial
Institute Monitoring Board).
β1 SCOREBDi,t : Score index of the board of
commissioners, that is the
total score obtained divided by
maximal score (that is 51).
β2 SCOREACi,t : S co re i n d ex o f t h e a u d i t
committee obtained, that is the
total score obtained divided by
the maximal score (that is 33).
β3 CREDITOR i,t : ratio of the amount of credit
from bank with a good credit
monitoring quality divided by
total asset of the company i at
the year t.
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: Variable dummy (1,0) with a
value of 1 when the proportion
of the Family’s ownership is >
50% and 0 if the proportion of
the family is < 50%.
β5 FOREIGNi,t : The foreign capital ownership
is a proportion of the shares
owned by the foreigner(s) from
the total shares circulated.
β6 YOUNGi,t : The dummy variable (1,0) with
a value of 1 if the company is
in the Young life cycle category
and 0 if others.
β7 MATUREi : The dummy variable (1,0) with
a value of 1 if the company is
in the Mature life cycle category
and 0 if others.
β8 LVRGi,t
: The value received from total
liabilities divided by total asset.
Β9 SIZEi,t
: The natural logarithm from the
book value of total asset of the
company at the end of the fiscal
year.
β10 YEARSi,t : The dummy variable for the
years effect.
β11 INDUSTRYi,t: The dummy variable for the
industry effect
i,t

Variable Construction
The dependent variable in this study is
accounting fraud. The data regarding this
accounting fraud is derived from BAPEPAMLK from the years 2007-2011 in the form of
sanctions published by BAPEPAM-LK. Based
on this data, it has identified companies that
have committed accounting fraud during the
period of 2005-2011. The indicator used to
value the dummy variable is the value 1 for
companies which have committed accounting
fraud.
The effectiveness score of board of
commissioners and audit committee is
calculated based on the values cumulated
from the checklist as arranged by the
characteristics of board of commissioners and
audit committee, which include independency,
activity, size, and competence. This checklist
is developed by Hermawan (2009) and is used
in the study to calculate the effectiveness score
of the board of commissioners and the audit

committee. The score is calculated based on the
total point from each question in the checklist.
Each questions can obtained maximum value
3 (three) for “Good” answer, 2 (two) for “Fair”
answer, and minimum value 1 (one) for “Poor”
answer. The total number of the questionnaire
is 28 questions.
To calculate the score of board of
commissioner, the questionnaire have 17
checklist questions, consist of 6 questions to
measure board independence, 6 questions
to measure board activities, 1 question to
measure board size, and 4 questions to measure
board expertise and competence. Therefore,
maximum score of board of commissioner
can be obtained from the questionnaire is 51
(17 questions x 3 for “Good” answer) and
minimum score is 17 (17 questions x 1 for
“Poor” answer).
To calculate score of audit committee,
the questionnaire have 11 checklist questions,
consist of 8 questions to measure audit
committee activities, 1 question to measure
audit committee size, and 2 questions to
measure audit committee expertise and
competence. Therefore, maximum score
of audit committee can be obtained from
the questionnaire is 33 (11 questions x 3 for
“Good” answer) and minimum score is 11 (11
questions x 1 for “Poor” answer).
Indonesia has adopted a two-tier system
in the company's board structure, the board
of commissioners and the board of directors.
Board of commissioners is separated with the
board of directors. The board of commissioners
plays a role in providing supervision and
overseeing the board of directors in managing
the company. In the studies conducted in
other countries that are mostly one-tier
system, the term of board of directors does
not have the same meaning as the one used in
Indonesia, but its role are similar to the role
of the board of commissioners in companies
in Indonesia. Thus, in this study, the term of
board will be used for the board of directors in
a one-tier system, while the term of board of
commissioners will be used for companies that
adopt a two tier system.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of the Board of Commissioners
Category

Number of
Questions *

Independence

6

Activity

6

Size

1

Competency

4

Total Score

17

Fraud /
Pairsample
Fraud
Pairsample
Total
Fraud
Pairsample
Total
Fraud
Pairsample
Total
Fraud
Pairsample
Total
Fraud
Pairsample
Total

Min

Max

Mean

Median

Standard
deviation

7
7
7
6
6
6
1
1
1
4
6
4
21
24
21

15
15
15
18
18
18
3
3
3
12
12
12
44
48
48

9.77
10.64
10.20
12.53
12.79
12.66
1.64
1.74
1.69
9.72
10.19
9.96
33.66
35.36
34.51

10
10
10
14
12
13
1
1
1
10
10
10
34
35
34.5

2.20
1.97
2.12
3.60
2.89
3.25
0.94
0.97
0.95
2.07
1.33
1.75
21
24
5.19

* Each questions can obtain a value of 1 for the lowest value and 3 for the highest

The bank as a creditor has the capacity
to control the company which has become its
debtor in the framework to ensure the safeness
of the given loan. The controlling level done
by the banks can be different from each other,
depending on the quality of credit monitoring
system from each bank. A bank which has a
good performance, especially in its credit
management, is a reflection of corporate
governance of the company. This study has
determined the classification of the bank that
has good monitoring abilities (Hermawan
2009 and Ahmadina 2011) based on the
following criteria: (1) Bank is bank which
has a total asset of above IDR 1 trillion based
on the ranking data of Infobank publication
2006-2012; (2) Bank must have a “very good”
and “good” rating according to Infobank
publication 2006-2012; (3) Bank has a Non
Performing Loan (NPL) rating under 5% based
on the ranking data of Infobank publication
2006-2012. The bank which fulfills these three
criteria is considered to be the bank that has
conducted the debtor monitoring well, so that it
has become one of the mechanism of corporate
governance. Ahn and Choi (2009) have used
the proxy to measure the monitoring rate using
the loan amount given by the bank compared

to the total asset owned by the company, the
amount of loan which is calculated is the loan
received by the bank which is included in the
group of banks that have fulfilled the criteria as
explained before.
According to Arifin (2003), companies
with family ownership are defined as companies
in which their shares of ownership is > 5% (in
which their names are mentioned in financial
reports) and are not owned by government,
financial institution, or society (individual
whose ownership is not mentioned in the
financial report). In this study, the dummy
variable (1, 0) is used with a value of 1 if the
company with family ownership proportion is
> 50% and 0 if the family ownership proportion
is ≤ 50%.
According to Said et al. (2009), the
foreign ownership is explained in the form of
the amount of proportion of shares owned by
a foreign party compared to the total shares
circulated. Data of the foreign ownership
is obtained from KSEI (Kustodian Sentral
Efek Indonesia/The Indonesian Central Stock
Custodian).
This study has divided the life cycle
of company into three stages of life cycles
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics Audit Committee Score
Category

Number of
Questions *

Activity

8

Size

1

Competency

2

Total Score

11

Fraud /
Pairsample
Fraud
Pairsample
Total
Fraud
Pairsample
Total
Fraud
Pairsample
Total
Fraud
Pairsample
Total

Min

Max

Mean

Median

8
8
8
1
1
1
2
2
2
11
11
11

23
23
23
3
3
3
6
6
6
32
31
32

14.91
16.06
15.49
2.04
2.00
2.02
4.13
5.09
4.61
21.09
23.15
22.12

15.00
16.00
15.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
22.00
23.00
22.00

Standard
deviation
4.79
3.82
4.35
0.55
0.36
0.46
1.70
1.21
1.55
6.16
4.58
5.50

* Each questions can obtain a value of 1 for the lowest value and 3 for the highest

(young, mature and old), that is: The category
of companies that may have a possibility to
conduct fraud (companies that are in the young
and mature stages of their life cycle), and the
category of companies that have a low tendency
to conduct fraud (companies that are in the old
stage of their life cycle). Base on DeAngelo
et al. (2006) study, retained earnings, which is
measured as proportion of total equity (RE/TE),
is used as a proxy to calculate company’s life
cycle stage. This proxy can measure whether
the firms use financing that rely on internal or
external parties for funding. Companies with
the lower levels of RE/TE tend to be in the
growth phase stage capital formation, while
firms with a higher level of RE/TE tend to be
in the mature and old stage with profits that
have been accumulated so that the company
can make self-financing.
LIFECYCLE i,t = Retained Earningsi,t : Total
Equityi,t
Explanation:
LIFECYCLEi,t : Dummy variable (1,0) from
the company’s life cycle i at year t, that is:
1. Young i,t = 1 for companies with a young
life cycle and = 0 if others
2. Mature i,t = 1 for companies with a
mature life cycle and = 0 others

Retained Earnings i,t : company’s retained
earnings i at year t
Total Equityi,t : total value of the company’s
equity i at year t
The company’s life cycle is determined
by putting the companies in the right order
based on RE/TE proxy ratio, after which,
25% companies with the highest RE/TE are
categorized in the old stage of their life cycle,
whereas 25% the companies with the lowest
RE/TE are categorized as companies which
are in the young stage of their life cycle. The
rest are categorized into companies which are
in the mature stage of their life cycle.
RESULT
Descriptive Statistics
The mean score for the board of
commissioners is 34.51. It can be concluded
that all research observation has an effective
board of commissioners (Table 4).
In general, the board of commissioners in
the whole research observation does not have
a good independency characteristic (mean
10.22, whereas the maximum value can be
obtain is 18). Mean for the activity category
(total number of board meeting) is 12.66,
where as the maximum value can be obtain
is 18, this figure explains that the activity
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characteristics of board of commissioners
in this observation has an averaged of good
activity. The mean for the category size of
board of commissioners is 1.69, which means
that most of the observations in this study
have less than five members of commissioners
board. For the competence category, the
mean is 9.96 which mirrors that the board of
commissioners in this observation study has a
relative good competence. In total, the average
score of board of commissioners is 34.5, which
means that the board of commissioners in this
study has a medium level of effectiveness in
average.
Table 5 shows that the average mark of
activity characteristics is 15.49, which means
that in average the audit committee in this
observation study has a relative medium
activity. The valuation criteria used when the
minimum members of the audit committee are
based on the minimum standard decided by the
BEI and BAPEPAM-LK, three persons, will
have a fair mark. Therefore, the average value
for the category size of the audit committee is
2.02. For the category competence, the mean
is 4.61, indicates that most of the observation
studies of audit committee member have
educational background in accounting. In
addition, this value also indicates that the
age of audit committee members in this
observation study is relative young. In total,
audit committee has an average score of
22.12, which means that the effectiveness
of audit committee role in this observation
study in the average is at the medium level. In
general, companies which are fraudulent have
in average after lower score compared to the
pair sample companies. This can indicates that
the effectiveness of audit committee role of the
fraudulent company is lower compared to the
pair sample company.
Empirical Tests
Table 6 shows that the categories of
questions about the independency have a P
value < 0.05, which means that for the non
normal distribution data, there is a significant
difference in the independence between
fraudulent companies and those that do not
conduct fraud.
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Table 6
Difference Test Score of the Effectiveness of the
Board of Commissioners
Category
Activity
Independence
Size
Competency

Significance
0.753
0.035 *
0.566
0.616

* Significance level at α=5%

Based on Table 7, the questions about the
competence have a P value < 0.05. Therefore,
it can be concluded that for the non normal
distribution data, there is significant difference
regarding the competence between the
fraudulent and non fraudulent companies.
This study uses logistic regression to test
the effectiveness of board of commissioners,
effectiveness of audit committee, monitoring
bank, family ownership, foreign ownership,
and the firm life cycle in the probability of
fraud occurrence. The logistic regression test
is presented in Table 8. Looking at Count R2
= 63% and the total significant variables at
Table 8, it can be concluded that the model can
predict 63% accurately.
Table 7
Difference Test of the Audit Committee
Category

Significance

Activity
Size
Competency

0.202
0.660
0.014 *

* Significance level at α=5%

Based on the result of logistic regression in
Table 8, it can be seen that variable SCOREBD
has a negative coefficient, however it is not
significant at α= 10%. The result of the test
shows that the score of board of commissioners
does not have any effect on the probability of
fraud. This means that an effective board of
commissioners will not lessen the probability
of fraud occurance in financial report. Hence,
this result does not support the hypothesis 1a so
that hypothesis 1a is rejected. The result of this
study is consistent with the study conducted
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by Jia et al. (2009), which examined some
characteristics of the board, among others,
number of meeting, board’s size, board’s
tenure, and age of the board members. Some
of those variables do not show a significant
testing result. The variable that does not show
the effects are the board size, tenure of board,
and age of the board members. The studies of
Uzun et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2006) do
not find any association between the size of
board and the number of meetings with fraud.
Based on the logistic regression in Table 8,
it can be seen that the variable SCOREAC has
a consistent negative effect, and is significant
at α= 5%. The result of its testing shows
that the value of audit committee affects the
probability that fraud will occur. This means
that fraud in financial report can be decreased
by an effective audit committee. The result
supports hypothesis 2a, so that hypothesis
2 cannot be rejected. The existence of the
effect of effective audit committee on the
probability of fraud as proved in this study
supports the results of the study conducted
by Rezaee (2003). He finds that the function
of an effective audit committee will prevent
the probability of fraud occurrence. Rezaee
also includes some frauds in some American
companies, due to the ineffectiveness of audit
committee. The study of Jackson et al. (2009)
finds that the probability of fraud occurrences
in financial reports is related to the audit
committee’s independence and the number of
meetings of the audit committee.
The result of the regression in Table
8 shows that the variable CREDITOR has
a negative coefficient, however, it is not
significant at α = 10%. The result of the test
shows that the value of CREDITOR does not
affect the probability that fraud will occur.
This means that the role of monitoring from
the bank could not decrease the possibility
that fraud will happen in financial report.
This result does not support hypothesis of
3a, so that the hypothesis 3a is rejected. Most
studies in the past have not dealt with the role
of the creditor as a mechanism of corporate
governance. Until recently, only the study of
Ahn and Choi (2009), Hermawan (2009) and

Ahmadina (2011) have become the basis for
this study. In contrast to earlier findings by Ahn
and Choi, this study finds that the role of the
monitoring bank will not influence towards the
lessening the probability to conduct fraud. This
may have been caused by the low proportion
of bank loan, especially from banks with good
monitoring ability towards the capital structure
of this observation study. This indicates that
the bank, as the external party in corporate
governance of company, has not played the
monitoring role well. The monitoring bank
is not as effective as the monitoring role of
the company’s internal. One of the reasons is
the limitation of information which may have
been obtained by the external party because of
its position outside the company.
The result of the regression in Table 8
shows that variable FAMOWN has a negative
coefficient, and is significant at α= 10%. The
result shows that the control of family affects
the probability of fraud occurrence, so this
study supports hypothesis 4a, and thus the
hypothesis 4a is not rejected. This means that
fraud in financial report can be decreased by the
increasing of controlled family ownership. The
result of this testing supports Arifin’s (2003)
study which shows that public companies in
Indonesia controlled by families have less
agency problem if compared to companies
controlled by public or without a majority
shareholders. According to him, in companies
that are controlled by families, there is less
agency problems because of the decrease of
conflicts between principal and agent. If the
family ownership is more efficient and the
agency is better, there is no problem between
the interest of agent and principal, which means
that the management will lead the company as
well as possible for the benefit of the “family”,
so that the company will be run efficiently and
honestly.
The testing of hypothesis 5a shows that
FOREIGN variable has negative coefficient.
However it is not significant at α = 10%. This
testing means capital structure which owned
by foreign has no significant influence to the
probability of fraud occurrence in Indonesia.
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Table 8
Logistic Regression Result
P(FRAUD)i,t = α + β1 SCOREBDi,t + β2 SCOREACi,t + β3 CREDITOR i,t + β4 FAMOWNi,t + β5 FOREIGNi,t +
β6 YOUNGi,t + β7 MATUREi,t + β8 LVRGi,t + β9 SIZEi,t +
Variables

Exp. Sign

YEARSi,t +

INDUSTRYi,t + ε i,t

Coefficient

Std. Error

z-Statistic

Prob

-0.353

6.421

-0.055

0.478

C
SCOREBD

-

-2.933

2.992

-0.980

0.163

SCOREAC

-

-2.789

1.732

-1.611

0.054*

CREDITOR

-

-1.891

2.382

-0.794

0.214

FAMOWN

-

-0.787

0.554

-1.419

0.078*

FOREIGN

-

-1.239

1.104

-1.122

0.131

YOUNG

+

0.486

0.715

0.679

0.248

MATURE

+

0.421

0.609

0.691

0.245

LVRG

+

0.809

0.503

1.606

0.054*

SIZE

+

0.124

0.217

0.573

0.283

YEAR2006

0.420

1.931

0.217

0.414

YEAR2007

0.951

1.584

0.600

0.274

YEAR2008

1.148

1.597

0.719

0.236

YEAR2009

2.448

1.939

1.263

0.103

YEAR2010

1.524

1.690

0.902

0.183

YEAR2011

0.454

1.873

0.242

0.404

ANINDUSTRI

-0.554

1.486

-0.373

0.355

INDBRGKONS

-0.294

1.198

-0.245

0.403

INDDSRKIMIA

0.321

1.319

0.244

0.404

DGNGJASAINV

-0.132

1.483

-0.089

0.465

PERTAMBANGAN

0.007

1.107

0.006

0.498

PROPERTI

-0.183

1.484

-0.123

0.451

TRANSINFRA

-0.578

0.986

-0.586

0.279

McFadden R-squared

0.089

Count R

2

63%

** Significance level α = 5% (one-tailed)
* Significance level α = 10% (one-tailed)
Total Observation is 94, FRAUD = Companies that get the sanction from Bapepam-LK; SCOREBD = Board of
Director effectiveness score; SCOREAC = Audit Committee effectiveness score; CREDITOR = Ratio of Total Amount
of Lending from Bank which have good monitoring divided by company total asset; FAMOWN = dummy variable
(1,0) value with 1 if family ownership proportion > 50% and value with 0 if family ownership proportion < 50%;
FOREIGN = proportion of stock owns by foreign divided by total outstanding stock; YOUNG = dummy variable (1,0)
with value with 1 if firm on young life cycle stage and value with 0 if others; MATURE = dummy variable (1,0) value
with 1 if firm on mature life cycle stage and value with 0 if others; LVRG = Total liabilities divided by total asset;
SIZE = Natural logarithm from total asset book value at the end of fiscal year

This result support Jia et al. (2009) and
Chen et al. (2006) study, which shows that
foreign ownership doesn’t have effects on the
probability of fraud.

The life cycle of firm doesn’t have
significant effect on the probability of fraud.
Table 8 shows that variable YOUNG and
MATURE have positive coefficient, although
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it is not significant at α= 10%. One possible
reason that cause this test is not significant
is fraud does not occur through earnings
management, such as misstatement, materiality,
violated disclosure, and disclosure of facts
material that is not true, therefore the effect
cannot be captured through measurement of
the company life cycle stage. Other possible
reason is the proxy of this variable cannot
accurately capture at which stage the life cycle
of the firm.
Based on Table 8, the control variable
leverage has a positive coefficient at level 5%.
This means that the greater the leverage of a
company, the greater the probability of fraud
will occur. This result has been supported
by the following studies. Perols and Lougee
(2011) have observed that companies which
have a high debt ratio have the potential to
conduct violations towards loan agreements,
because there is a strong pressure towards
the management to obey the loan agreement,
assuming that companies with bad performances
are pressured to conduct fraud in their financial
reports. Leverage is positively correlated with
the accounting policy to increase profit. If the
management policy of increasing the profit
is not sufficient to avoid violation of the debt
covenant, manager will tend to be motivated
to acknowledge the smaller obligation or to
admit larger asset (Persons 2005).
Based on Table 8, control variable size
has a positive coefficient. However, it is not
significant at level of 10%. The result of the
test shows that size does not affect fraud
probability. This study support the previous
study of Jia et al. (2009) which have proven
that size does not affect the probability of fraud
occurrence. The other control variable years
and industry also have positive coefficient, but
it is not significant at level of 10%. This means
that time and type of industry do not affect the
probability of fraud occurrence.
		CONCLUSION
This study is aimed at testing whether
there are effects of the effectiveness score of
board of commissioners, effectiveness score

of audit committee, monitoring role of bank,
family ownership, control of capital from the
foreign capital, and the life cycle of company
on the fraud occurrence on financial report.
Based on the analysis of results discussed
above, the following conclusion can be drawn:
The effectiveness score of board of
commissioners has no effect on the probability
of fraud occurrence in financial report. This
means that the performance of effective
board of commissioners does not make lower
the probability of fraud. The effectiveness
score of audit committee has a negative and
significant effect on the probability that fraud
will occur in financial report. This indicates
that the more effective the performance of
audit committee, the smaller the probability
of fraud occurrence. There is a distinction
among the independency characteristics of the
board of commissioners between companies
doing fraud and not. Whereas, for the audit
committee characteristics, there is a difference
between the characteristics of competence
between companies which conduct fraud and
not conduct.
The role of monitoring of bank does not
affect the probability of fraud occurrence. This
means that the loan ratio from the bank with
the ability of good monitoring divided by the
total asset will not lower the probability of
committing fraud. This indicates that banks as
the external party in thecorporate governance of
company fail to play the monitoring role well.
The role of monitoring by bank as the external
party in the corporate governance of company
cannot be as effective as the monitoring role
played by the company’s internal part.
The ownership structure of the company
shows that the company with foreign ownership
could not lessen the probability of the fraud
occurrence.
The life cycle of company at the young
stage has no significant effect on the probability
of fraud occurence . This means that fraud can
happen at different stages of the life cycle of
company. The life cycle of company at the
mature stage will not significantly affect the
probability of fraud occurrence in financial
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report. This means that fraud can happen at
different stages of company life cycle.
These findings provide implications that
can become contributions for some parties,
such as for a company, based on the above
results, the company is expected to make
thoughtful considerations when deciding
the company’s policies of company, such as
increase in the application of good corporate
governance, especially the improvement
of the audit committee role effectiveness.
In the election company's capital structure,
ownership of which is controlled by the family
will have a lower probability to commit fraud,
so it would be better if a company's capital
structure to have larger portion for family (>
50%).
Several limitations of this study need to be
acknowledged. First, this study focuses only on
the BAEPEPAM-LK fraud report of the year
2007-2011. As data become available in the
upcoming years, future studies may re-examine
the issue. Second, corporate governance is
measured by effectiveness score of board
of commissioner and audit committee only.
There are other criteria mechanism to measure
corporate governance, such as competency,
duration, director’s independence, internal
audit report mechanism, and competency of
external audit firm. This study relies only on
secondary data in evaluating the score board of
commissioner and audit committee. The proxy
of firm life cycle may not be able to describe
the stages of the cycle accurately.
In future research, it might be possible
to extend the research period, such as (i)
using other variables in measuring corporate
governance, such as the board of directors
variables (age, gender, hours of work,
competencies, and outside or inside director),
internal audit (whether the internal audit is
reported to audit committee or to management,
competency members of the internal audit), or
external audits (Big Four or non Big Four);
(ii) obtaining an index score of boards of
commissioners and audit committees by using
data other than secondary data (annual financial
report) with questionnaires or surveys to better
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reflect the condition of board of commissioners
and audit committees; (iii) using different
ways for control sample selection; or (iv) use
another proxy in measuring life cycle stages,
such as average sales growth or dividend payout rate.
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